We describe a working implementation of a variant of Gentry's fully homomorphic encryption scheme (STOC 2009), similar to the variant used in an earlier implementation effort by Smart and Vercauteren (PKC 2010). Smart and Vercauteren implemented the underlying "somewhat homomorphic" scheme, but were not able to implement the bootstrapping functionality that is needed to get the complete scheme to work. We show a number of optimizations that allow us to implement all aspects of the scheme, including the bootstrapping functionality.
Introduction
Encryption schemes that support operations on encrypted data (aka homomorphic encryption) have a very wide range of applications in cryptography. This concept was introduced by Rivest et al. shortly after the discovery of public key cryptography [14] , and many known public-key cryptosystems support either addition or multiplication of encrypted data. However, supporting both at the same time seems harder, and until very recently all the attempts at constructing so-called "fully homomorphic" encryption turned out to be insecure. In 2009, Gentry described the first plausible construction of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem [4] . Gentry's construction consists of several steps: He first constructed a "somewhat homomorphic" scheme that supports evaluating low-degree polynomials on the encrypted data, next he needed to "squash" the decryption procedure so that it can be expressed as a low-degree polynomial which is supported by the scheme, and finally he applied a "bootstrapping" transformation to obtain a fully homomorphic scheme. The crucial point in this process is to obtain a scheme that can evaluate polynomials of high-enough degree, and at the same time has decryption procedure that can be expressed as a polynomial of low-enough degree. Once the degree of polynomials that can be evaluated by the scheme exceeds the degree of the decryption polynomial (times two), the scheme is called "bootstrappable" and it can then be converted into a fully homomorphic scheme.
The Smart-Vercauteren implementation
The first attempt to implement Gentry's scheme was made in 2010 by Smart and Vercauteren [17] . They chose to implement a variant of the scheme using "principal-ideal lattices" of prime determinant. Such lattices can be represented implicitly by just two integers (regardless of their dimension), and moreover Smart and Vercauteren described a decryption method where the secret key is represented by a single integer. Smart and Vercauteren were able to implement the underlying somewhat homomorphic scheme, but they were not able to support large enough parameters to make Gentry's squashing technique go through. As a result they could not obtain a bootstrappable scheme or a fully homomorphic scheme.
One obstacle in the Smart-Vercauteren implementation was the complexity of key generation for the somewhat homomorphic scheme: For one thing, they must generate very many candidates before they find one whose determinant is prime. (One may need to try as many as n 1.5 candidates when working with lattices in dimension n.) And even after finding one, the complexity of computing the secret key that corresponds to this lattice is at leastΘ(n 2.5 ) for lattices in dimension n. For both of these reasons, they were not able to generate keys in dimensions n > 2048.
Moreover, Smart and Vercauteren estimated that the squashed decryption polynomial will have degree of a few hundreds, and that to support this procedure with their parameters they need to use lattices of dimension at least n = 2 27 (≈ 1.3 × 10 8 ), which is well beyond the capabilities of the key-generation procedure.
Our implementation
We continue in the same direction of the Smart-Vercauteren implementation and describe optimizations that allow us to implement also the squashing part, thereby obtaining a bootstrappable scheme and a fully homomorphic scheme.
For key-generation, we present a new faster algorithm for computing the secret key, and also eliminate the requirement that the determinant of the lattice be prime. We also present many sim-plifications and optimizations for the squashed decryption procedure, and as a result our decryption polynomial has degree only fifteen. Finally, our choice of parameters is somewhat more aggressive than Smart and Vercauteren (which we complement by analyzing the complexity of known attacks).
Differently from [17] , we decouple the dimension n from the size of the integers that we choose during key generation. 2 Decoupling these two parameters lets us decouple functionality from security. Namely, we can obtain bootstrappable schemes in any given dimension, but of course the schemes in low dimensions will not be secure. Our (rather crude) analysis suggests that the scheme may be practically secure at dimension n = 2 13 or n = 2 15 , and we put this analysis to the test by publishing a few challenges in dimensions from 512 up to 2 15 .
Organization
We give some background in Section 2, and then the report is organized in two parts. In Part I we describe our implementation of the underlying "somewhat homomorphic" encryption scheme, and in Part II we describe our optimizations that are specific to the bootstrapping functionality. To aid reading, we list here all the optimizations that are described in this report, with pointers to the sections where they are presented.
Somewhat-homomorphic scheme.
1. We replace the Smart-Vercauteren requirement [17] that the lattice has prime determinant, by the much weaker requirement that the Hermite normal form (HNF) of the lattice has a particular form, as explained in Step 3 of Section 3. We also provide a simple criterion for checking for this special form.
6. The public key of the bootstrappable scheme contains an instance of the sparse-subset-sum problem, and we use instances that have a very space-efficient representation. Specifically, we derive our instances from geometric progressions. See Section 9.1.
7. Similarly, the public key of the fully homomorphic scheme contains an encryption of all the secret-key bits, and we use a space-time tradeoff to optimize the space that it takes to store all these ciphertexts without paying too much in running time. See Section 9.2.
Finally, our choice of parameters is presented in Section 10, and some performance numbers are given in Section 11. Throughout the text we put more emphasis on concrete parameters than on asymptotics, asymptotic bounds can be found in [18] .
Background
Notations. Throughout this report we use '·' to denote scalar multiplication and '×' to denote any other type of multiplication. For a rational number q, we denote by ⌈q⌋ the rounding of q to the nearest integer, and by [q] we denote the distance between q and the nearest integer. 
Lattices
A full-rank n-dimensional lattice is a discrete subgroup of R n , concretely represented as the set of all integer linear combinations of some basis B = ( ⃗ b 1 , . . . , ⃗ b n ) ∈ R n of linearly independent vectors. Viewing the vectors ⃗ b i as the rows of a matrix B ∈ R n×n , we have:
Every lattice (of dimension n > 1) has an infinite number of lattice bases. If B 1 and B 2 are two lattice bases of L, then there is some unimodular matrix U (i.e., U has integer entries and det(U ) = ±1) satisfying B 1 = U × B 2 . Since U is unimodular, | det(B i )| is invariant for different bases of L, and we may refer to it as det(L). This value is precisely the size of the quotient group Z n /L if L is an integer lattice. To basis B of lattice L we associate the half-open parallelepiped Every full-rank lattice has a unique Hermite normal form (HNF) basis where b i,j = 0 for all i < j (lower-triangular), b j,j > 0 for all j, and for all i > j b i,j ∈ [−b j,j /2, +b j,j /2). Given any basis B of L, one can compute HNF(L) efficiently via Gaussian elimination. The HNF is in some sense the "least revealing" basis of L, and thus typically serves as the public key representation of the lattice [10] .
Short vectors and Bounded Distance Decoding. The length of the shortest nonzero vector in a lattice L is denoted λ 1 (L), and Minkowski's theorem says that for any n-dimensional lattice
Heuristically, for random lattices the quantity det(L) 1/n serves as a threshold: for t ≪ det(L) 1/n we don't expect to find any nonzero vectors in L of size t, but for t ≫ det(L) 1/n we expect to find exponentially many vectors in L of size t.
In the "bounded distance decoding" problem (BDDP), one is given a basis B of some lattice L, and a vector ⃗ c that is very close to some lattice point of L, and the goal is to find the point in L nearest to ⃗ c. In the promise problem γ-BDDP, we have a parameter γ > 1 and the promise that dist(L, ⃗ c)
(BDDP is often defined with respect to λ 1 rather than with respect to det(L) 1/n , but the current definition is more convenient in our case.)
Gama and Nguyen conducted extensive experiments with lattices in dimensions 100-400 [3] , and concluded that for those dimensions it is feasible to solve γ-BDDP when γ > 1.01 n ≈ 2 n/70 . More generally, the best algorithms for solving the γ-BDDP in n-dimensional lattices take time exponential in n/ log γ. Specifically, currently known algorithms can solve dimension-n γ-BDDP in time 2 k up to γ = 2 µn k/ log k , where µ is a parameter that depends on the exact details of the algorithm. (Extrapolating from the Gama-Nguyen experiments, we expect something like µ ∈ [0.1, 0.2].)
Ideal lattices
Let f (x) be an integer monic irreducible polynomial of degree n. In this paper, we use f (x) = x n +1, where n is a power of 2. Let R be the ring of integer polynomials modulo
Each element of R is a polynomial of degree at most n − 1, and thus is associated to a coefficient vector in Z n . This way, we can view each element of R as being both a polynomial and a vector. For ⃗ v(x), we let ∥⃗ v∥ be the Euclidean norm of its coefficient vector. For every ring R, there is an associated expansion factor γ Mult 
However, for "random vectors" ⃗ u, ⃗ v the expansion factor is typically much smaller, and our experiments suggest that we typically have ∥⃗ u × ⃗ v∥ ≈ ∥⃗ u∥ · ∥⃗ v∥.
Let I be an ideal of R -that is, a subset of R that is closed under addition and multiplication by elements of R. Since I is additively closed, the coefficient vectors associated to elements of I form a lattice. We call I an ideal lattice to emphasize this object's dual nature as an algebraic ideal and a lattice. 3 Ideals have additive structure as lattices, but they also have multiplicative structure. The product IJ of two ideals I and J is the additive closure of the set {⃗ v × ⃗ w : ⃗ v ∈ I, ⃗ w ∈ J}, where '×' is ring multiplication. To simplify things, we will use principal ideals of R -i.e., ideals with a single generator. The ideal (⃗ v) generated by ⃗ v ∈ R corresponds to the lattice generated by
we call this the rotation basis of the ideal lattice (⃗ v).
Let K be a field containing the ring R (in our case
, where the inverse ⃗ v −1 is taken in the field K.
GGH-type cryptosystems
We briefly recall Micciancio's "cleaned-up version" of GGH cryptosystems [8, 10] . The secret and public keys are "good" and "bad" bases of some lattice L. More specifically, the key-holder generates a good basis by choosing B sk to be a basis of short, "nearly orthogonal" vectors. Then it sets the public key to be the Hermite normal form of the same lattice, B pk def = HNF(L(B sk )). A ciphertext in a GGH-type cryptosystem is a vector ⃗ c close to the lattice L(B pk ), and the message which is encrypted in this ciphertext is somehow embedded in the distance from ⃗ c to the nearest lattice vector. To encrypt a message m, the sender chooses a short "error vector" ⃗ e that encodes m, and then computes the ciphertext as ⃗ c ← ⃗ e mod B pk . Note that if ⃗ e is short enough (i.e., less than λ 1 (L)/2), then it is indeed the distance between ⃗ c and the nearest lattice point.
To decrypt, the key-holder uses its "good" basis B sk to recover ⃗ e by setting ⃗ e ← ⃗ c mod B sk , and then recovers m from ⃗ e. The reason decryption works is that, if the parameters are chosen correctly, then the parallelepiped P(B sk ) of the secret key will be a "plump" parallelepiped that contains a sphere of radius bigger than ∥⃗ e∥, so that ⃗ e is the point inside P(B sk ) that equals ⃗ c modulo L. On the other hand, the parallelepiped P(B pk ) of the public key will be very skewed, and will not contain a sphere of large radius, making it useless for solving BDDP.
Gentry's somewhat-homomorphic cryptosystem
Gentry's somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme [4] can be seen as a GGH-type scheme over ideal lattices. The public key consists of a "bad" basis B pk of an ideal lattice J, along with some basis B I of a "small" ideal I (which is used to embed messages into the error vectors). For example, the small ideal I can be taken to be I = (2), the set of vectors with all even coefficients.
A ciphertext in Gentry's scheme is a vector close to a J-point, with the message being embedded in the distance to the nearest lattice point. More specifically, the plaintext space is {0, 1}, which is embedded in R/I = {0, 1} n by encoding 0 as 0 n and 1 as 0 n−1 1. For an encoded bit ⃗ m ∈ {0, 1} n we set ⃗ e = 2⃗ r + ⃗ m for a random small vector ⃗ r, and then output the ciphertext ⃗ c ← ⃗ e mod B pk . The secret key in Gentry's scheme (that plays the role of the "good basis" of J) is just a short vector ⃗ w ∈ J −1 . Decryption involves computing the fractional part [ (2)). The reason that this scheme is somewhat homomorphic is that for two ciphertexts ⃗ c 1 = ⃗ j 1 + ⃗ e 1 and ⃗ c 2 = ⃗ j 2 + ⃗ e 2 , their sum is ⃗ j 3 + ⃗ e 3 where ⃗ j 3 = ⃗ j 1 + ⃗ j 2 ∈ J and ⃗ e 3 = ⃗ e 1 + ⃗ e 2 is small. Similarly, their product is ⃗ j 4 + ⃗ e 4 where ⃗ j 4 = ⃗ j 1 × ( ⃗ j 2 + ⃗ e 2 ) + ⃗ e 1 × ⃗ j 2 ∈ J and ⃗ e 4 = ⃗ e 1 × ⃗ e 2 is still small. If fresh encrypted ciphertexts are very very close to the lattice, then it is possible to add and multiply ciphertexts for a while before the error grows beyond the decryption radius of the secret key.
The Smart-Vercauteren Variant
Smart and Vercauteren [17] work over the ring R = Z[x]/f n (x), where f n (x) = x n + 1 and n is a power of two. The ideal J is set as a principal ideal by choosing a vector ⃗ v at random from some n-dimensional cube, subject to the condition that the determinant of (⃗ v) is prime, and then setting J = (⃗ v). It is known that such ideals can be implicitly represented by only two integers, namely the determinant d = det(J) and a root r of f n (x) modulo d. (An easy proof of this fact "from first principles" can be derived from our Lemma 1 below.) Specifically, the Hermite normal form of this ideal lattice is 
Gentry's fully-homomorphic scheme
As explained above, Gentry's somewhat-homomorphic scheme can evaluate low-degree polynomials but not more. Once the degree (or the number of terms) is too large, the error vector ⃗ e grows beyond the decryption capability of the private key. Gentry solved this problem using bootstrapping. He observed in [4] that a scheme that can homomorphically evaluate its own decryption circuit plus one additional operation, can be transformed into a fully-homomorphic encryption. In more details, fix two ciphertexts ⃗ c 1 , ⃗ c 2 and consider the functions
A somewhat-homomorphic scheme is called "bootstrappable" if it is capable of homomorphically evaluating the functions DAdd ⃗ c 1 ,⃗ c 2 and DMul ⃗ c 1 ,⃗ c 2 for any two ciphertexts ⃗ c 1 , ⃗ c 2 . Given a bootstrappable scheme that is also circular secure, it can be transformed into a fully-homomorphic scheme by adding to the public key an encryption of the secret key, ⃗ c * ← Enc pk (sk). Then given any two ciphertexts ⃗ c 1 , ⃗ c 2 , the addition/multiplication of these two ciphertexts can be computed by homomorphically evaluating the functions
. Note that the error does not grow, since we always evaluate these functions on the fresh ciphertext ⃗ c * from the public key. Unfortunately, the somewhat-homomorphic scheme from above is not bootstrappable. Although it is capable of evaluating low-degree polynomials, the degree of its decryption function, when expressed as a polynomial in the secret key bits, is too high. To overcome this problem Gentry shows how to "squash the decryption circuit", transforming the original somewhat-homomorphic scheme E into a scheme E * that can correctly evaluate any circuit that E can, but where the complexity of E * 's decryption circuit is much less than E's. In the original somewhat-homomorphic scheme E, the secret key is a vector ⃗ w. In the new scheme E * , the public key includes an additional "hint" about ⃗ w -namely, a big set of vectors S = {⃗ x i : i = 1, 2, . . . , S} that have a hidden sparse subset T that adds up to ⃗ w. The secret key of E * is the characteristic vector of the sparse subset T , which is denoted ⃗ σ = ⟨σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ S ⟩.
Whereas decryption in the original scheme involved computing ⃗ m ← ⃗ c − [ ⃗ w × ⃗ c] mod 2, in the new scheme the ciphertext ⃗ c is "post-processed" by computing the products ⃗ y i = ⃗ x i × ⃗ c for all of the vectors ⃗ x i ∈ S. Obviously, then, the decryption in the new scheme can be done by
Using some additional tricks, this computation can be expressed as a polynomial in the σ i 's of degree roughly the size of the sparse subset T . (The underlying algorithm could be a simple grade-school addition -add up the least significant column, bring a carry bit over to the next column if necessary, and so on.) With appropriate setting of the parameters, the subset T can be made small enough to get a bootstrappable scheme.
Part I
The "Somewhat Homomorphic" Scheme
Key generation
We adopt the Smart-Vercauteren approach [17] , in that we also use principal-ideal lattices in the ring of polynomials modulo f n (x) def = x n + 1 with n a power of two. We do not require that these principal-ideal lattices have prime determinant, instead we only need the Hermite normal form to have the same form as in Equation (1). During key-generation we choose ⃗ v at random in some cube, verify that the HNF has the right form, and work with the principal ideal (⃗ v). We have two parameters: the dimension n, which must be a power of two, and the bit-size t of coefficients in the generating polynomial. Key-generation consists of the following steps:
1. Choose a random n-dimensional integer lattice ⃗ v, where each entry v i is chosen at random as a t-bit (signed) integer. With this vector ⃗ v we associate the formal polynomial v(x)
, as well as the rotation basis:
The i'th row is a cyclic shift of ⃗ v by i positions to the right, with the "overflow entries" negated. Note that the i'th row corresponds to the coefficients of the polynomial
. Note that just like V itself, the entire lattice L(V ) is also closed under "rotation": Namely, for any vector
2. Next we compute the scaled inverse of v(x) modulo f n (x), namely an integer polynomial w(x) of degree at most n − 1, such that
Specifically, this constant is the determinant of the lattice L(V ), which must be equal to the resultant of the polynomials v(x) and f n (x) (since f n is monic). Below we denote the resultant by d, and denote the coefficient-vector of w(x) by ⃗ w = ⟨w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w n−1 ⟩. It is easy to check that the matrix
is the scaled inverse of V , namely W ×V = V ×W = d·I. One way to compute the polynomial w(x) is by applying the extended Euclidean-GCD algorithm (for polynomials) to v(x) and f n (x). See Section 4 for a more efficient method of computing w(x).
3. We also check that this is a good generating polynomial. We consider ⃗ v to be good if the Hermite-Normal-form of V has the same form as in Equation (1), namely all except the leftmost column equal to the identity matrix. See below for a simple check that the ⃗ v is good, in our implementation we test this condition while computing the inverse.
It was observed by Nigel Smart that the HNF has the correct form whenever the determinant is odd and square-free. Indeed, in our tests this condition was met with probability roughly 0.5, irrespective of the dimension and bit length, with the failure cases usually due to the determinant of V being even.
Checking the HNF. In Lemma 1 below we prove that the HNF of the lattice L(V ) has the right form if and only if the lattice contains a vector of the form ⟨−r, 1, 0, . . . , 0⟩. Namely, if and only if there exists an integer vector ⃗ y and another integer r such that
Multiplying the last equation on the right by W , we get the equivalent condition
In other words, there must exists an integer r such that the second row of W minus r times the first row yields a vector of integers that are all divisible by d:
The last condition can be checked easily: We compute r := w 0 /w 1 mod d (assuming that w 1 has an inverse modulo d), then check that r · w i+1 = w i (mod d) holds for all i = 1, . . . , n − 2 and also −r · w 0 = w n−1 (mod d) . Note that this means in particular that r n = −1 (mod d). (In our implementation we actually test only that last condition, instead of testing all the equalities
Lemma 1. The Hermite normal form of the matrix V from Equation (2) is equal to the identity matrix in all but the leftmost column, if and only if the lattice spanned by the rows of V contains a vector of the form
Proof. Let B be the Hermite normal form of V . Namely, B is lower triangular matrix with nonnegative diagonal entries, where the rows of B span the same lattice as the rows of V , and the absolute value of every entry under the diagonal in B is no more than half the diagonal entry above it. This matrix B can be obtained from V by a sequence of elementary row operations, and it is unique. It is easy to see that the existence of a vector ⃗ r of this form is necessary: indeed the second row of B must be of this form (since B is equal the identity in all except the leftmost column). We now prove that this condition is also sufficient. 
It is clear that the vector
. Below we will prove by induction that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, the lattice L(V ) contains the vector:
Placing all these vectors ⃗ r i at the rows of a matrix, we got exactly the matrix B that we need:
B is equal to the identity except in the leftmost column, its rows are all vectors in L(V ) (so they span a sub-lattice), and since B has the same determinant as V then it cannot span a proper sub-lattice, it must therefore span L(V ) itself.
It is left to prove the inductive claim. For i = 1 we set ⃗ r 1 def = ⃗ r and the claim follow from our assumption that ⃗ r ∈ L(V ). Assume now that it holds for some i ∈ [1, n − 2] and we prove for i + 1.
Recall that the lattice L(V ) is closed under rotation, and since
We can now reduce the first entry in this vector modulo d, by adding/subtracting the appropriate multiple of d · ⃗ e 1 (while still keeping it in the lattice), thus getting the lattice vector
This concludes the proof.
Remark 1. Note that the proof of Lemma 1 shows in particular that if the Hermite normal form
of V is equal to the identity matrix in all but the leftmost column, then it must be of the form specified in Equation (5 
The public and secret keys
In principle the public key is the Hermite normal form of V , but as we explain in Remark 1 and Section 5 it is enough to store for the public key only the two integers d, r. Similarly, in principle the secret key is the pair (⃗ v, ⃗ w), but as we explain in Section 6.1 it is sufficient to store only a single (odd) coefficient of ⃗ w and discard ⃗ v altogether.
Inverting the polynomial v(x)
The fastest known methods for inverting the polynomial v(x) modulo f n (x) = x n + 1 are based on FFT: We can evaluate v(x) at all the roots of f n (x) (either over the complex field or over some finite field), then compute w * (ρ) = 1/v(ρ) (where inversion is done over the corresponding field), and then interpolate w * = v −1 from all these values. If the resultant of v and f n has N bits, then this procedure will take O(n log n) operations over O(N )-bit numbers, for a total running time ofÕ(nN ). This is close to optimal in general, since just writing out the coefficients of the polynomial w * takes time O(nN ). However, in Section 6.1 we show that it is enough to use for the secret key only one of the coefficients of w = d · w * (where d = resultant(v, f n )). This raises the possibility that we can compute this one coefficient in time quasi-linear in N rather than quasi-linear in nN . Although polynomial inversion is very well researched, as far as we know this question of computing just one coefficient of the inverse was not tackled before. Below we describe an algorithm for doing just that. The approach for the procedure below is to begin with the polynomial v that has n small coefficients, and proceed in steps where in each step we halve the number of coefficients to offset the fact that the bit-length of the coefficients approximately doubles. Our method relies heavily on the special form of f n (x) = x n + 1, with n a power of two. Let ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n−1 be roots of f n (x) over the complex field: That is, if ρ is some primitive 2n'th root of unity then ρ i = ρ 2i+1 . Note that the roots r i satisfy that ρ i+ n 2 = −ρ i for all i, and more generally for every index i (with index arithmetic modulo n) and every j = 0, 1, . . . , log n, if we denote n j def = n/2 j then it holds that
The method below takes advantage of Equation (6), as well as a connection between the coefficients of the scaled inverse w and those of the formal polynomial
We invert v(x) mod f n (x) by computing the lower two coefficients of g(z), then using them to recover both the resultant and (one coefficient of) the polynomial w(x), as described next.
Step one: the polynomial g(z). Note that although the polynomial g(z) is defined via the complex numbers ρ i , the coefficients of g(z) are all integers. We begin by showing how to compute the lower two coefficients of g(z), namely the polynomial g(z) mod z 2 . We observe that since ρ i+
We observe further that for both the polynomials a(
, all the odd powers of x have zero coefficients. Moreover, the same equalities as above hold if we use
and b(x) themselves (since we only evaluate these polynomials in roots of f n ), and also for A, B all the odd powers of x have zero coefficients (since we reduce modulo f n (x) = x n + 1 with n even). Thus we can consider the polynomialsv,ṽ that have half the degree and only use the nonzero coefficients of A, B, respectively. Namely they are defined viav(x 2 ) = A(x) andṽ(x 2 ) = B(x). Thus we have reduced the task of computing the n-product involving the degree-n polynomial v(x) to computing a product of only n/2 terms involving the degree-n/2 polynomialsv(x),ṽ(x). Repeating this process recursively, we obtain the polynomial g(z) mod z 2 . The details of this process are described in Section 4.1 below.
Step two: recovering d and
We next show that the free term of w(x) is w 0 = g 1 /n. First, we observe that g 1 equals the sum of w evaluated in all the roots of f n , namely
where 
To show this, we write
where the Equality (⋆) holds since the i'th root of f n is ρ i = ρ 2i+1 where ρ is a 2n-th root of unity. Clearly, the term corresponding to j = 0 in Equation (7) is w 0 · n, it is left to show that all the other terms are zero. This follows since ρ j is a 2n-th root of unity different from ±1 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, and summing over all odd powers of such root of unity yields zero.
Step three: recovering the rest of w. We can now use the same technique to recover all the other coefficients of w: Note that since we work modulo f n (x) = x n + 1, then the coefficient w i is the free term of the scaled inverse of
In our case we only need to recover the first two coefficients, however, since we are only interested in the case where
After recovering w 0 , w 1 and d = resultant(v, f n ), we therefore compute the ratio r = w 1 /w 0 mod d and verify that r n = −1 (mod d). Then we recover as many coefficients of w as we need (via w i+1 = [w i · r] d ), until we find one coefficient which is an odd integer, and that coefficient is the secret key.
The gory details of step one
We denote U 0 (x) ≡ 1 and V 0 (x) = v(x), and for j = 0, 1, . . . , log n we denote n j = n/2 j . We proceed in m = log n steps to compute the polynomials U j (x), V j (x) (j = 1, 2, . . . , m), such that the degrees of U j , V j are at most n j − 1, and moreover the polynomial g j (z) =
) has the same first two coefficients as g(z). Namely,
Equation (8) holds for j = 0 by definition. Assume that we computed U j , V j for some j < m such that Equation (8) holds, and we show how to compute U j+1 and V j+1 . From Equation (6) we know
Denoting f n j (x) def = x n j + 1 and observing that ρ 2 j i is a root of f n j for all i, we next consider the polynomials: with coefficients a 0 , . . . , a n j −1 )
and observe the following:
is a root of f n j , then the reduction modulo f n j makes no difference when evalu-
• The odd coefficients of A j , B j are all zero. For A j this is because it is obtained as V j (x)V j (−x) and for B j this is because it is obtained as
The reduction modulo f n j (x) = x n j + 1 keeps the odd coefficients all zero, because n j is even.
We therefore set
so the second bullet above implies that U j+1 (x 2 ) = B j (x) and V j+1 (x 2 ) = A j (x) for all x. Combined with the first bullet, we have that
By the induction hypothesis we also have g j (z) = g(z) (mod z 2 ), so we get g j+1 (z) = g(z) (mod z 2 ), as needed.
Encryption
To encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1} with the public key B (which is implicitly represented by the two integers d, r), we first choose a random 0, ±1 "noise vector" ⃗ u def = ⟨u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u n−1 ⟩, with each entry chosen as 0 with some probability q and as ±1 with probability (1 − q)/2 each. We then set
. . , 2u n−1 ⟩, and the ciphertext is the vector
We now show that also ⃗ c can be represented implicitly by just one integer. Recall that B (and therefore also B −1 ) are of a special form
, and
Denote ⃗ a = ⟨a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ⟩, and also denote by a(·) the integer polynomial a(x)
Hence the fractional part of
, and the ciphertext vector 
. Hence, to encrypt the bit b, we only need to evaluate the noise-polynomial u(·) at the point r, then multiply by two and add the bit b (everything modulo d). We now describe an efficient procedure for doing that.
An efficient encryption procedure
The most expensive operation during encryption is evaluating the degree-(n − 1) polynomial u at the point r. Polynomial evaluation using Horner's rule takes n − 1 multiplications, but it is known that for small coefficients we can reduce the number of multiplications to only O( √ n), see [1, 12] . Moreover, we observe that it is possible to batch this fast evaluation algorithm, and evaluate k such polynomials in time O( √ kn). We begin by noting that evaluating many 0, ±1 polynomials at the same point x can be done about as fast as a naive evaluation of a single polynomial. Indeed, once we compute all the powers (1, x, x 2 , . . . , x n−1 ) then we can evaluate each polynomial just by taking a subset-sum of these powers. As addition is much faster than multiplication, the dominant term in the running time will be the computation of the powers of x, which we only need to do once for all the polynomials.
Next, we observe that evaluating a single degree-(n − 1) polynomial at a point x can be done quickly given a subroutine that evaluates two degree-(n/2 − 1) polynomials at the same point x. Namely, given u(
Evaluating these two smaller polynomials we get y bot = u bot (x) and y top = u top (x), and then we can compute y = u(x) by setting y = x n/2 y top + y bot . If the subroutine for evaluating the two smaller polynomials also returns the value of x n/2 , then we need just one more multiplication to get the value of y = u(x).
These two observations suggest a recursive approach to evaluating the 0, ±1 polynomial u of degree n − 1. Namely, we repeatedly cut the degree in half at the price of doubling the number of polynomials, and once the degree is small enough we use the "trivial implementation" of just computing all the powers of x. Analyzing this approach, let us denote by M (k, n) the number of multiplications that it takes to evaluate k polynomials of degree (n − 1). Then we have M (k, n) ≤ min(n − 1, M (2k, n/2) + k + 1). To see the bound M (k, n) ≤ M (2k, n/2) + k + 1, note that once we evaluated the top-and bottom-halves of all the k polynomials, we need one multiplication per polynomial to put the two halves together, and one last multiplication to compute x n (which is needed in the next level of the recursion) from x n/2 (which was computed in the previous level). Obviously, making the recursive call takes less multiplications than the "trivial implementation" whenever n − 1 > (n/2 − 1) + k + 1. Also, an easy inductive argument shows that the "trivial implementation" is better when n − 1 < (n/2 − 1) + k + 1. We thus get the recursive formula
Solving this formula we get M (k, n) ≤ min(n − 1, √ 2kn). In particular, the number of multiplications needed for evaluating a single degree-(n − 1) polynomial is M (1, n) ≤ √ 2n. We comment that this "more efficient" batch procedure relies on the assumption that we have enough memory to keep all these partially evaluated polynomials at the same time. In our experiments we were only able to use it in dimensions up to n = 2 15 , trying to use it in higher dimension resulted in the process being killed after it ran out of memory. A more sophisticated implementation could take the available amount of memory into account, and stop the recursion earlier to preserve space at the expense of more running time. An alternative approach, of course, is to store partial results to disk. More experiments are needed to determine what approach yields better performance for which parameters.
The Euclidean norm of fresh ciphertexts
When choosing the noise vector for a new ciphertext, we want to make it as sparse as possible, i.e., increase as much as possible the probability q of choosing each entry as zero. The only limitation is that we need q to be bounded sufficiently below 1 to make it hard to recover the original noise vector from c. There are two types of attacks that we need to consider: lattice-reduction attacks that try to find the closest lattice point to c, and exhaustive-search/birthday attacks that try to guess the coefficients of the original noise vector (and a combination thereof). Pure lattice-reduction attacks should be thwarted by working with lattices with high-enough dimension, so we concentrate here on exhaustive-search attacks.
Roughly, if the noise vector has ℓ bits of entropy, then we expect birthday-type attacks to be able to recover it in 2 ℓ/2 time, so we need to ensure that the noise has at least 2λ bits of entropy for security parameter λ. Namely, for dimension n we need to choose q sufficiently smaller than one so that 2 (1−q)n · ( n qn ) > 2 2λ . Another "hybrid" attack is to choose a small random subset of the powers of r (e.g., only 200 of them) and "hope" that they include all the noise coefficients. If this holds then we can now search for a small vector in this low-dimension lattice (e.g., dimension 200). For example, if we work in dimension n = 2048 and use only 16 nonzero entries for noise, then choosing 200 of the 2048 entries, we have probability of about (200/2048) 16 ≈ 2 54 of including all of them (hence we can recover the original noise by solving 2 54 instances of SVP in dimension 200). The same attack will have success probability only ≈ 2 −80 if we use 24 nonzero entries.
For our public challenges we chose a (somewhat aggressive) setting where the number of nonzero entries in the noise vector is between 15 and 20. We note that increasing the noise will have only moderate effect on the performance numbers of our fully-homomorphic scheme, for example using 30 nonzero entries is likely to increase the size of the key (and the running time) by only about 5-10%.
Decryption
The decryption procedure takes the ciphertext c (which implicitly represents the vector ⃗ c = ⟨c, 0, . . . , 0⟩) and in principle it also has the two matrices V, W . The vector ⃗ a = 2⃗ u + b · ⃗ e 1 that was used during encryption is recovered as
and then outputs the least significant bit of the first entry of ⃗ a, namely b := a 0 mod 2. The reason that this decryption procedure works is that the rows of V (and therefore also of W ) are close to being orthogonal to each other, and hence the operator l ∞ -norm of W is small. Namely, for any vector ⃗ x, the largest entry in ⃗ x × W (in absolute value) is not much larger than the largest entry in ⃗ x itself. Specifically, the procedure from above succeeds when all the entries of ⃗ a × W are smaller than d/2 in absolute value. To see that, note that ⃗ a is the distance between ⃗ c and some point in the lattice L(V ), namely we can express ⃗ c as ⃗ c = ⃗ y × V + ⃗ a for some integer vector ⃗ y.
where the equality (⋆) follows since
But this last condition holds if and only if [⃗
is equal to its fractional part, which means that every entry in ⃗ a × W/d must be less than 1/2 in absolute value.
An optimized decryption procedure
We next show that the encrypted bit b can be recovered by a significantly cheaper procedure: Recall that the (implicitly represented) ciphertext vector ⃗ c is decrypted to the bit b when the distance from ⃗ c to the nearest vector in the lattice L(V ) is of the form ⃗ a = 2⃗ u + b ⃗ e 1 , and moreover all the entries in ⃗ a × W are less than d/2 in absolute value. As we said above, in this case we have
On the other hand, we have
Putting these two equations together, we get that any decryptable ciphertext c must satisfy the relation
In other words, for every i we have [c 
How Homomorphic is This Scheme?
We ran some experiments to get a handle on the degree and number of monomials that the somewhat homomorphic scheme can handle, and to help us choose the parameters. In these experiments we generated key pairs for parameters n (dimension) and t (bit-length), and for each key pair we encrypted many bits, evaluated on the ciphertexts many elementary symmetric polynomials of various degrees and number of variables, decrypted the results, and checked whether or not we got back the same polynomials in the plaintext bits.
More specifically, for each key pair we tested polynomials on 64 to 256 variables. For every fixed number of variables m we ran 12 tests. In each test we encrypted m bits, evaluated all the elementary symmetric polynomials in these variables (of degree up to m), decrypted the results, and compared them to the results of applying the same polynomials to the plaintext bits. For each setting of m, we recorded the highest degree for which all 12 tests were decrypted to the correct value. We call this the "largest supported degree" for those parameters.
In these experiments we used fresh ciphertexts of expected Euclidean length roughly 2· √ 20 ≈ 9, regardless of the dimension. This was done by choosing each entry of the noise vector ⃗ u as 0 with probability 1 − 20 n , and as ±1 with probability 10 n each. With that choice, the degree of polynomials that the somewhat-homomorphic scheme could evaluate did not depend on the dimension n: We tested various dimensions from 128 to 2048 with a few settings of t and m, and the largest supported degree was nearly the same in all these dimensions. Thereafter we tested all the other settings only in dimension n = 128.
The results are described in Figure 1 . As expected, the largest supported degree grows linearly with the bit-length parameter t, and decreases slowly with the number of variables (since more variables means more terms in the polynomial).
These results can be more or less explained by the assumptions that the decryption radius of the secret key is roughly 2 t , and that the noise in an evaluated ciphertext is roughly c degree × √ #-of-monomials, where c is close to the Euclidean norm of fresh ciphertexts (i.e., c ≈ 9). For elementary symmetric polynomials, the number of monomials is exactly Trying to fit the data from Figure 1 to this expression, we observe that c is not really a constant, rather it gets slightly smaller when t gets larger. For t = 64 we have c ∈ [9.14, 11.33], for t = 128 we have c ∈ [7.36, 8.82 ], for t = 256 we get c ∈ [7.34, 7 .92], and for t = 384 we have c ∈ [6.88, 7.45]. We speculate that this small deviation stems from the fact that the norm of the individual monomials is not exactly c deg but rather has some distribution around that size, and as a result the norm of the sum of all these monomials differs somewhat from √ #-of-monomials times the expected c deg .
Part II

A Fully Homomorphic Scheme 8 Squashing the Decryption Procedure
Recall that the decryption routine of our "somewhat homomorphic" scheme decrypts a ciphertext c ∈ Z d using the secret key is not yet bootstrappable. To achieve bootstrapping, we therefore change the secret-key format and add some information to the public key to get a decryption routine of lower degree, as done in [4] . On a high level, we add to the public key also a "big set" of elements {x i ∈ Z d : i = 1, 2, . . . , S}, such that there exists a very sparse subset of the x i 's that sums up to w modulo d. The secret key bits will be the characteristic vector of that sparse subset, namely a bit vector ⃗ σ = ⟨σ 1 , . . . , σ S ⟩ such that the Hamming weight of ⃗ σ is s ≪ S, and
we post-process it by computing (in the clear) all the integers
We note that the y i 's are in the interval [0, d) rather than [−d/2, +d/2). This is done for implementation convenience, and correctness is not impacted since the sum of these y i 's is later reduced again modulo d to the internal [−d/2, +d/2). We now show that (under some conditions), this function D c,d (·) can be expressed as a low-degree polynomial in the bits σ i . We have:
and therefore to compute D c,d (⃗ σ) we can reduce modulo 2 each term in the right-hand-side separately, and then XOR all these terms:
(where the last equality follows since d is odd and so ⟨d⟩ 2 = 1). Note that the y i 's and d are constants that we have in the clear, and D c,d is a functions only of the σ i 's. Hence the first big XOR is just a linear functions of the σ i 's, and the only nonlinear term in the expression above is the rounding function
. We observe that if the ciphertext c of the underlying scheme is much closer to the lattice than the decryption capability of w, then wc is similarly much closer to a multiple of d than d/2. In the bootstrappable scheme we will therefore keep the noise small enough so that the distance from c to the lattice is below 1/(s + 1) of the decryption radius, and thus the distance from wc to the nearest multiple of d is bounded below d/2(s + 1). (Recall that s is the the number of nonzero bits in the secret key.) Namely, we have
and therefore also 
And since the distance between the latter sum and the nearest integer is smaller than 1/2(s+1), then the distance between the former sum and the same integer is strictly smaller than 1/2(s + 1) + s/2(s + 1) = 1/2. It follows that both sums will be rounded to the same integer, namely
Note that zi is in the interval [0, 1], and in particular it could be equal to 1.
We conclude that for a ciphertext c which is close enough to the underlying lattice, the function
, and moreover the only nonlinear part in this computation is the addition and rounding (modulo two) of the z i 's, which all have only p bits of precision to the right of the binary point.
Adding the z i 's
Although it was shown in [4] that adding a sparse subset of the "low precision" numbers σ i z i 's can be done with a low-degree polynomial, a naive implementation (e.g., using a simple grade-school addition) would require computing about s · S multiplications to implement this operation. We now describe an alternative procedure that requires only about s 2 multiplications.
For this alternative procedure, we use a slightly different encoding of the sparse subset. Namely, instead of having a single vector ⃗ σ of Hamming weight s, we instead keep s vectors ⃗ σ 1 , . . . , ⃗ σ s , each of Hamming weight 1, whose bitwise sum is the original vector ⃗ σ. (In other words, we split the '1'-bits in ⃗ σ between the s vectors ⃗ σ k , putting a single '1' in each vector.) In our implementation we also have s different big sets, B 1 , . . . , B s , and each vector ⃗ σ k chooses one element from the corresponding B k , such that these s chosen elements sum up to w modulo d. We denote the elements of B k by {x(k, i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , S}, and the bits of ⃗ σ k by σ k,i . We also
with p bits of precision to the right of the binary point. Using these notations, we can re-write the decryption function
, we observe that each q k is obtained by adding S numbers, at most one of which is nonzero. We can therefore compute the j'th bit of q k by simply XOR-ing the j'th bits of all the numbers σ k,i z(k, i) (for i = 1, 2, . . . , S), since we know a-priori that at most one of these bits in nonzero. When computing homomorphic decryption, this translate to just adding modulo d all the ciphertexts corresponding to these bits. The result is a set of s numbers u j , each with the same precision as the z's (i.e., only p = ⌈log(s + 1)⌉ bits to the right of the binary point).
Grade-school addition. Once we have only s numbers with p = ⌈log(s + 1)⌉ bits of precision in binary representation, we can use the simple grade-school algorithm for adding them: We arrange these numbers in s rows and p + 1 columns: one column for each bit-position to the right of the binary point, and one column for the bits to the left of the binary point. We denote these columns (from left to right) by indexes 0, −1, . . . , −p. For each column we keep a stack of bits, and we process the columns from right (−p) to left (0): for each column we compute the carry bits that it sends to the columns on its left, and then we push these carry bits on top of the stacks of these other columns before moving to process the next column.
In general, the carry bit that column −j sends to column −j + ∆ is computed as the elementary symmetric polynomial of degree 2 ∆ in the bits of column −j. If column −j has m bits, then we can compute all the elementary symmetric polynomials in these bits up to degree 2 ∆ using less than m2 ∆ multiplications. The ∆'s that we need as we process the columns in order (column −p, then 1 − p, all the way through column −1) are p − 1, p − 1, p − 2, p − 3, . . . 1, respectively. Also, the number of bits in these columns at the time that we process them are s, s + 1, s + 2, . . . , s + p − 1, respectively. Hence the total number of multiplications throughout this process is bounded by
Other addition algorithms. One can also use other algorithms to add these s numbers of precision p, which could could be done in less than O(s 2 ) multiplications. (For example, using the 3-for-2 trick as proposed in [4] requires only O(s · p) multiplications.) In our implementation we nonetheless used grade-school addition since (a) it results in a slightly smaller polynomial degree (only 15 rather than 16, for our parameters); and (b) the addition algorithm takes only about 10% of the total running time, hence optimizing its performance had low priority for us.
Reducing the Public-Key Size
Two main factors contribute to the size of the public key of the fully-homomorphic scheme. One is the need to specify an instance of the sparse-subset-sum problem, and the other is the need to include in the public key also encryption of all the secret-key bits. In the next two subsections we show how we reduce the size of each of these two parts.
The Sparse-Subset-Sum Construction
Recall that with the optimization from Section 8.1, our instance of the Sparse-Subset-Sum problem consists of s "big sets" B 1 , . . . , B s , each with S elements in Z d , such that there is a collection of elements, one from each B k , that add up to the secret key w modulo d. Representing all of these big sets explicitly would require putting in the public key s·S elements from Z d . Instead, we keep only s elements in the public key, x 1 , . . . , x s , and each of these elements implicitly defines one of the big sets. Specifically, the big sets are defined as geometric progressions in Z d : the k'th big set B k consists of the elements
where R is some parameter. Our sparse subset is still one element from each progression, such that these s elements add up to the secret key w. Namely, there is a single index i k in every big set such that
The parameter R is set to avoid some lattice-reduction attacks on this specific form of the sparse-subset-sum problem, see the bottom of Section 10.2 for more details.
Encrypting the Secret Key
As we discussed in Section 8.1, the secret key of the squashed scheme consists of s bit-vectors, each with S bits, such that only one bit in each vector is one, and the others are all zeros. If we encrypt each one of these bits individually, then we would need to include in the public key s · S ciphertexts, each of which is an element in Z d . Instead, we would like to include an implicit representation that takes less space but still allows us to compute encryptions of all these bits.
Since the underlying scheme is somewhat homomorphic, then in principle it is possible to store for each big set B k an encrypted description of the function that on input i outputs 1 iff i = i k . Such a function can be represented using only log S bits (i.e., the number of bits that it takes to represent i k ), and it can be expressed as a polynomial of total degree log S in these bits. Hence, in principle it is possible to represent the encryption of all the secret-key bits using only s log S ciphertexts, but there are two serious problems with this solution:
Recall the decryption function from Equation (9),
Since the encryption of each of the bits σ k,i is now a degree-log S polynomial in the ciphertexts that are kept in the public key, then we need the underlying somewhat-homomorphic scheme to support polynomials of degrees log S times higher than what would be needed if we store all the σ k,i themselves. Perhaps even more troubling is the increase in running time: Whereas before computing the bits of be the set of pairs of distinct numbers in [1, c] . by i(a, b) the index of the pair (a, b) (in the lexicographical order over
In particular, if a k , b k are the indexes of the two 1-encryptions (in the group corresponding to the k'th big set
A naive implementation of the homomorphic decryption with this representation will compute explicitly the encryption of every secret key bit (by multiplying two ciphertexts), and then add a subset of these ciphertexts. Here we use a better implementation, where we first add the ciphertexts in groups before multiplying. Specifically, let {η 
Since we have the bits of z(k, i(a, b)) in the clear, we can get the encryptions of the bits of η (a, b) ) by multiplying the ciphertext for η , but we can choose it even larger. Increasing c will increase the size of the public key accordingly, but decrease the number of multiplications that need to be computed when evaluating Equation (10) . In particular, setting c = ⌈2 √ S ⌉ increases the space requirements (over c = ⌈ √ 2S ⌉) only by a √ 2 factor, but cuts the number of multiplications in half. Accordingly, in our implementation we use the setting c = ⌈2 √ S ⌉.
Setting the Parameters
The security parameters λ and µ
There are two main security parameters that drive the choice of all the others: one is a security parameter λ (that controls the complexity of exhaustive-search/birthday attacks on the scheme), and the other is a "BDDP-hardness parameter" µ. More specifically, the parameter µ it quantifies bit-size of the coefficients of the generator polynomial v n = 2 11 , 2 13 , 2 15 the dimension of the lattice S = 1024, 1024, 4096 size of the big sets R = 2 51 , 2 204 , 2 850 ratio between elements in the big sets Table 1 : The various parameters of the fully homomorphic scheme. The specific numeric values correspond to our three challenges.
the exponential hardness of the Shortest-Vector-Problem (SVP) and Bounded-Distance Decoding problems (BDDP) in lattices. Specifically, we assume that for any k and (large enough) n, it takes time 2 k to approximate SVP or BDDP in n-dimensional lattices 6 to within a factor of 2 µ·n k/ log k . We use this specific form since it describes the asymptotic behavior of our best algorithms for approximating SVP and BDDP (i.e., the ones based on block reductions [15] ).
We can make a guess as to the "true value" of µ by extrapolating from the results of Gama and Nguyen [3] : They reported achieving BDDP approximation factors of 1.01 n ≈ 2 n/70 for "unique shortest lattices" in dimension n in the range of 100-400. Assuming that their implementation took ≈ 2 40 computation steps to compute, we have that µ log(40)/40 ≈ 1/70, which gives µ ≈ 0.11.
For our challenges, however, we start from larger values of µ, corresponding to stronger (maybe false) hardness assumptions. Specifically, our three challenges correspond to the three values µ ≈ 2.17, µ ≈ 0.54, and µ ≈ 0.14. This makes it plausible that at least the smaller challenges could be solved (once our lattice-reduction technology is adapted to lattices in dimensions a few thousands). For the security parameter λ we chose the moderate value λ = 72. (This means that there may be birthday-type attacks on our scheme with complexity 2 72 , at least in a model where each bignum arithmetic operation counts as a single step.)
The other parameters
Once we have the parameters λ and µ, we can compute all the other parameters of the system.
The sparse-subset size s and precision parameter p. The parameter that most influences our implementation is the size of the sparse subset. Asymptotically, this parameter can be made as small as Θ(λ/ log λ), 7 so we just set it to be λ/ log λ, rounded up to the next power of two minus one. For λ = 72 we have λ/ log λ ≈ 11.7, so we set s = 15.
Next we determine the precision p that we need to keep of the z(k, i)'s. Recall that for any element in any of the big sets x(k, i) ∈ B k we set z(k, i) to be a p-bit-precision approximation of the rational number ⟨c · x(k, i)⟩ d /d. To avoid rounding errors, we need p to be at least ⌈log(s + 1)⌉, so for s = 15 we have p = 4. This means that we represent each z(k, i) with four bits of precision The degree of squashed decryption. We observe that using the grade-school algorithm for adding s = 2 p − 1 integers, each with p bits of precision, the degree of the polynomial that describes the carry bit to the p + 1'st position is less than 2 p . Specifically for the cases of s = 15 and p = 4, the degree of the carry bit is exactly 15. To see this, Figure 2 describes the carry bits that result from adding the bits in each of the four columns to the right of the binary point (where we ignore carry bits beyond the first position to the left of the point):
• The carry bit from column −4 to column −3 is a degree-2 polynomial in the bits of column −4, the carry bit to column −2 is a degree-4 polynomial, the carry bit to column −1 is a degree-8 polynomial, and there are no more carry bits (since we add only 15 bits).
• The carry bit from column −3 to column −2 is a degree-2 polynomial in the bits of column −3, including the carry bit from column −4. But since that carry bit is itself a degree-2 polynomial, then any term that includes that carry bit has degree 3. Hence the total degree of the carry bit from column −3 to column −2 is 3. Similarly, the total degrees of the carry bits from column −3 to columns −1, 0 are 5, 9, respectively (since these are products of 4 and 8 bits, one of which has degree 2 and all the others have degree 1).
• By a similar argument every term in the carry from column −3 to −2 is a product of two bits, but since column −3 includes two carry bits of degrees 4 and 3, then their product has total degree 7. Similarly, the carry to column 0 has total degree 9 (= 4 + 3 + 1 + 1).
• Repeating the same argument, we get that the total degree of the carry bit from column −1 to columns 0 is 15 (= 7 + 8).
We conclude that the total degree of the grade-school addition algorithm for our case is 15, but since we are using the space/degree trade-off from Section 9.2 then every input to this algorithm is itself a degree-2 polynomial, so we get total degree of 30 for the squashed-decryption polynomial.
One can check that the number of degree-15 monomials in the polynomial representing our grade-school addition algorithm is
. Also, every bit in the input of the grade-school addition algorithm is itself a sum of S bits, each of which is a degree-2 monomial in the bits from the public key. Hence each degree-15 monomial in the grade-school addition polynomial corresponds to S 15 degree-30 monomials in the bits from the public key, and the entire decryption polynomial has 2 34 × S 15 degree-30 monomials.
The bit-size t of the generating polynomial. Since we need to support a product of two homomorphically-decrypted bits, then our scheme must support polynomials with 2 68 · S 30 degree-60 monomials. Recall from Section 5.2 that we choose the noise in fresh ciphertexts with roughly 15-20 nonzero ±1 coefficients, and we multiply the noise by 2, so fresh ciphertexts have Euclidean norm of roughly 2 √ 20 ≈ 9. Our experimental results from Section 7 suggest that for a degree-60 polynomial with M terms we need to set the bit-length parameter t large enough so that 2 t ≥ c 60 × √ M where c is slightly smaller than the norm of fresh ciphertexts (e.g., c ≈ 7 for sufficiently large values of t).
We therefore expect to be able to handle homomorphic-decryption (plus one more multiplication) if we set t large enough so that 2 t−p ≥ c 60 · √ 2 68 · S 30 . (We use 2 t−p rather than 2 t since we need the resulting ciphertext to be 2 p closer to the lattice than the decryption radium of the key, see Section 8.) For our concrete parameters (p = 4, S ≤ 2048) we get the requirement 2 t−p ≥ c 60 · 2 (68+11·30)/2 = c 60 · 2 199 .
Using the experimental estimate c ≈ 7 (so c 60 ≈ 2 170 ), this means that we expect to be able to handle bootstrapping for t ≈ 170 + 199 + 4 = 373. Our experiments confirmed this expectation, in fact we were able to support homomorphic decryption of the product of two bits by setting the bit-length parameter to t = 380.
The dimension n. We need to choose the dimension n large enough so that the achievable approximation factor 2 µn log λ/λ is larger than the Minkowski bound for the lattice (which is ≈ 2 t ), so we need n = λt/µ log λ. In our case we have t = 380 and λ/ log λ ≈ 11.67, so choosing the dimension as n ∈ {2 11 , 2 13 , 2 15 } corresponds to the settings µ ∈ {2.17, 0.54, 0.14}, respectively.
Another way to look at the same numbers is to assume that the value µ ≈ 0.11 from the work of Gama and Nguyen [3] holds also in much higher dimensions, and deduce the complexity of breaking the scheme via lattice reduction. For n = 2048 we get λ/ log λ = 2048 · 0.11/380 < 1, which means that our small challenge should be readily breakable. Repeating the computations with this value of µ = 0.11 for the medium and large challenges yields λ ≈ 6 and λ ≈ 55, corresponding to complexity estimates of 2 6 and 2 55 , respectively. Hence, if this estimate holds then even our large challenge may be feasibly breakable (albeit with significant effort).
This "optimistic" view should be taken with a grain of salt, however, since there are significant polynomial factors that need to be accounted for. We expect that once these additional factors are incorporated, our large challenge will turn out to be practically secure, perhaps as secure as RSA-1024. We hope that our challenges will spur additional research into the "true hardness" of lattice reduction in these high dimensions.
The big-set size S. One constraint on the size of the big sets is that birthday-type exhaustive search attacks on the resulting SSSP problem should be hard. Such attacks take time S ⌈s/2⌉ , so we need S ⌈s/2⌉ ≥ 2 λ . For our setting with λ = 72, s = 15, we need S 8 ≥ 2 72 , which means S ≥ 512.
Another constraint on S is that it has to be large enough to thwart lattice attacks on the SSSP instance. The basic lattice-based attack consists of putting all the s · S elements in all the big sets Table 2 : Parameters of the underlying somewhat-homomorphic scheme. The bit-length of the determinant is |d| ≈ log 2 d. Decryption time in dimension 512 is below the precision of our measurements.
with w being the secret key of the somewhat homomorphic scheme 8 and d being the determinant of the lattice (i.e., the modulus in the public key). Clearly, if σ 1,1 , . . . , σ s,S are the bits of the secret key, then the lattice spanned by the rows of B contains the vector ⟨σ 1,1 , . . . , σ s,S , 1, 0⟩, whose length is √ sS + 1. To hide that vector, we need to ensure that the BDDP approximation factor for this lattice is larger than the Minkowski bound for it, namely 2 µ(sS+2) log λ/λ ≥ sS+2 √ d ≈ 2 tn/(sS+2) , which is roughly equivalent to sS ≥ √ tnλ/µ log λ. Using s = 15, t = 380, λ = 72 and the values of n and µ in the different dimensions, this gives the bounds S ≥ 137 for the small challenge, S ≥ 547 for the medium challenge, and S ≥ 2185 for the large challenge.
Combining the two constraints, we set S = 512 for the small challenge, S = 547 for the medium challenge, and S = 2185 for the large challenge.
The ratio R between elements in the big sets. Since we use "big sets" of a special type (i.e., geometric progressions mod d), we need to consider also a lattice attack that uses this special form. Namely, we consider the lattice that includes only the first element in each progression 
Performance
We used a strong contemporary machine to evaluate the performance of our implementation: We run it on an IBM System x3500 server, featuring a 64-bit quad-core Intel Xeon E5450 processor, running at 3GHz, with 12MB L2 cache and 24GB of RAM. Our implementation uses Shoup's NTL library [16] version 5.5.2 for high-level numeric algorithms, and GNU's GMP library [7] version 5.0.1 for the underlying integer arithmetic operations. The code was compiled using the gcc compiler (version 4.4.1) with compilation flags gcc -O2 -m64.
